Undecidable Cases of Model Checking Probabilistic Temporal-Epistemic
  Logic (Extended Abstract) by van der Meyden, R & Patra, M K
R. Ramanujam (Ed.): TARK 2015
EPTCS 215, 2016, pp. 264–282, doi:10.4204/EPTCS.215.19
c© R. van der Meyden & M. K. Patra
Undecidable Cases of Model Checking Probabilistic
Temporal-Epistemic Logic (Extended Abstract)∗
Ron van der Meyden
School of Computer Science and Engineering
UNSW Australia
meyden@cse.unsw.edu.au
Manas K Patra
School of Computer Science and Engineering
UNSW Australia
manas.patra@gmail.com
We investigate the decidability of model-checking logics of time, knowledge and probability, with
respect to two epistemic semantics: the clock and synchronous perfect recall semantics in partially
observed discrete-time Markov chains. Decidability results are known for certain restricted logics
with respect to these semantics, subject to a variety of restrictions that are either unexplained or
involve a longstanding unsolved mathematical problem. We show that mild generalizations of the
known decidable cases suffice to render the model checking problem definitively undecidable. In par-
ticular, for a synchronous perfect recall, a generalization from temporal operators with finite reach
to operators with infinite reach renders model checking undecidable. The case of the clock seman-
tics is closely related to a monadic second order logic of time and probability that is known to be
decidable, except on a set of measure zero. We show that two distinct extensions of this logic make
model checking undecidable. One of these involves polynomial combinations of probability terms,
the other involves monadic second order quantification into the scope of probability operators. These
results explain some of the restrictions in previous work.
1 Introduction
Model checking is a verification methodology used in computer science, in which we ask whether a given
model satisfies a given formula of some logic. First proposed in the 1980’s [6], model checking is now a
rich area, with a large body of associated theory and well developed implementations that automate the
task of model checking. Significant use of model checking tools is made in industry, in particular, in the
verification of computer hardware designs.
Model checking developed originally in a setting where the specifications are expressed in a propo-
sitional temporal logic, and the systems to be verified are finite state automata. This setting has the
advantage of being decidable, and a great deal of work has gone into the development of algorithms and
heuristics for its efficient implementation. More recently, the field has explored the extent to which the
expressiveness of both the model representations and of the specification language can be extended while
retaining decidability of model checking. Extensions in the systems dimensions considered include real-
time systems [2], systems with a mixed continuous and discrete dynamic [27], richer automaton models
such as push-down automata, machines with first-in-first out queues etc. In the dimension of the speci-
fication language, extensions considered include elements of second order logic and specific constructs
to capture the richer properties of the systems models described above (e.g. in the real time case the
specification language might contain inequalities over time values.)
Model checking for epistemic logic was first mooted in [18], and model checking for the combination
of temporal and epistemic logic has been developed both theoretically [29, 10, 21] and in practice [14, 26,
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23, 9]. A variety of semantics for knowledge are known to be associated with decidable model checking
problems in finite state systems, in particular, the observational semantics (in which an agent reasons
based on its present observation) the clock semantics (in which an agent reasons based on its present
observation and the present clock value), and synchronous and asynchronous versions of perfect recall,
all admit decidable model checking in combination with quite rich temporal expressiveness [29, 10, 21].
Orthogonally, a line of work on probabilistic model checking has considered model checking of
assertions about probability and time [33]. Although one might at first expect this line of work to be
closely related to epistemic model checking, in that probability theory provides a model of uncertainty,
in fact this area has been concerned not with how subjective probabilities change over time, but with a
probabilistic extension of temporal logic. The focus tends to be on the prior probability of some temporal
property, or on the probability that some temporal property holds in runs from a current known state.
Rather less attention has been given to model checking the combination of subjective probability and
temporal expressiveness. Of the semantics for knowledge mentioned above, the clock and synchronous
perfect recall semantics are most suited as a basis for model checking subjective probability. (The others
suffer from asynchrony, which makes it more difficult to associate a single natural probability space.)
Implementations for these semantics presently exist only for a limited set of formulas, in which the
full power of temporal logic is not used. For example, results in [20] for model checking the logic of
subjective probability (with clock or synchronous perfect recall semantics) and time restricts the temporal
operators to have only finite reach into the future, and does not handle operators such as “at all times in
the future”.
A fundamental reason underlying this is that the problem of model checking probability with a rich
temporal expressiveness seems to be inherently complex. Indeed, it requires a solution to a basic math-
ematical problem, the Skolem Problem for linear recurrences, that has stood unsolved since first posed
in the 1930’s [35]. Consequently, the strongest results on model checking probability and time that
encompass the expressiveness required for model checking knowledge and subjective probability state
decidability in a way that requires exclusion of an infinite set of difficult instances for which decidabil-
ity is unresolved. Specifically, [3] shows that a (weak) monadic second order logic PMLO, containing
probability assertions of forms such as Pr(φ(t1, . . . , tn)) > c, in which the ti take values in the natural
numbers, representing discrete time points, is decidable in finite state Markov chains, provided that the
rational number c is not in a set Hφ depending on φ which can taken to be of arbitrarily small non-zero
measure. This work leaves open the decidability of the model checking problem for the language in its
full generality, in particular, for the values of c in Hφ.
Our contribution in this paper is to consider a number of generalizations of PMLO, motivated by
model checking a logic of time and subjective probability. In particular, our generalizations arise very
naturally when attempting to deal with the way that an agent conditions probability on its observations.
We show that these generalizations definitively result in undecidable model checking problems. This
clarifies the boundary between the decidable and undecidable cases of model checking logics of proba-
bility and time.
We begin in section 2 by recalling the definition of probabilistic interpreted systems [17], which
provides a very general semantic framework for logics of time, knowledge and probability. We work
with an instantiation of this general framework in which systems are generated from finite state partially
observed discrete-time Markov chains. We define two logics that take semantics in this framework. The
first is an extension of the branching time temporal logic CTL∗ to include operators for knowledge and
probability, including operators for the subjective probability of agents. The second is a more expressive
monadic second order logic that also adds a capability to quantify over moments of time and finite sets of
moments of time. In this logic, the agent knowledge and probability operators are indexed by a temporal
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variable. This logic generalizes the logic of [3]. Our logics allow polynomial comparisons of probability
terms, as well as comparisons of agent probability terms referring to multiple time points. We argue from
a number of motivating applications that this level of expressiveness is useful in potential applications.
We show in Section 3 that the monadic second order logic is as least as expressive as our probabilistic
extension of CTL∗. Indeed, some apparently mild extensions of PMLO suffice for the encoding: the
epistemic and subjective probability operators can be eliminated using a universal modality, polynomial
combinations of probability expressions, and a more liberal use of quantification than allowed in PMLO.
We then turn in Section 4 to an investigation of the model checking problem. Specifically, we show
that model checking even very simple formulas about a single agent’s probability is undecidable when
the agent has perfect recall. A consequence of this result is that an extension of PMLO that adds second
order quantification into the scope of probability is undecidable.
This suggests a focus on weaker epistemic semantics instead, in particular, the clock semantics. From
the point of view of PMLO, to express agent’s subjective probabilities with respect to the clock semantics
requires polynomial combinations of simple global probability terms of the form “ the probability that
proposition p holds at time t”. We formulate a simple class of formulas involving such polynomial
combinations, and show that this also has undecidable model checking.
These results show that even simple model checking questions about subjective probability are unde-
cidable, and moreover help to explain some unexplained restrictions on PMLO in [3]: these restrictions
are in fact necessary in order to obtain a decidable logic. We conclude with a discussion of future work
in Section 5. Related work most closely related to our results is discussed in the context of presenting
and motivating the results.
2 Probabilistic Knowledge
We describe in this section the semantic setting for the model checking problem we consider. We model
a set of agents making partial observations of an environment that evolves with time. We first present
the semantics of the modal logic we consider, following [17], using the general notion of probabilistic
interpreted system. Since these structures are not finite, in order to have a finite input for a model
checking problem, we derive a probabilistic interpreted system from a partially observed discrete-time
Markov chain. This is done in two ways, depending on the degree of recall of the agents. Taking the
Markov chain to be finite, we obtain finitely presented model checking problems whose complexity we
then study.
2.1 Probabilistic Interpreted Systems
Probabilistic interpreted systems are defined as follows. Let Agt = {1, . . . ,n} be a set of agents operating
in an environment e. At each moment of time, each agent is assumed to be in some local state, which
records all the information that the agent can access at that time. The environment e records “everything
else that is relevant”. Let S be the set of environment states and let Li be the set of local states of agent
i ∈ Agt. A global state of a multi-agent system is an (n+1)-tuple s = (se, s1, . . . , sn) such that se ∈ S and
si ∈ Li for all i ∈ Agt. We write G = S ×L1× . . .×Ln for the set of global states.
Time is represented discretely using the natural numbers N. A run is a function r :N→G, specifying
a global state at each moment of time. A pair (r,m) consisting of a run r and time m ∈N is called a point.
If r(m) = (se, s1, . . . , sn) then we define re(m) = se and ri(m) = si for i ∈ Agt. If r is a run and m ∈N a time,
we write r[0..m] for r(0) . . .r(m) and re[0..m] for re(0) . . .re(m). A system is a set R of runs. We call R×N
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the set of points of the system R.
Agent knowledge is captured using a relation of indistinguishability. Two points (r,m) and (r′,m′)
are said to be indistinguishable to agent i, if the agent is in the same local state at these points. Formally,
we define ∼i to be the equivalence relation on R×N given by (r,m) ∼i (r′,m′), if ri(m) = r′i (m′). Relative
to a system R, we define the set
Ki(r,m) = {(r′,m′) ∈ R×N | (r′,m′) ∼i (r,m)}
to be the set of points that are, for agent i, indistinguishable from the point (r,m). Intuitively, Ki(r,m) is
the set of all points that the agent considers possible when it is in the actual situation (r,m). A system is
said to be synchronous if for all agents i, we have that (r′,m′) ∈ Ki(r,m) implies that m = m′. Intuitively,
in a synchronous system, agents always know the time. Since it is more difficult to define probabilistic
knowledge in systems that are not synchronous, we confine our attention to synchronous systems in what
follows.
A probability space is a triple Pr = (W,F ,µ) such that W is a (nonempty) set, called the carrier,
F ⊆ P(W) is a σ-field of subsets of W, called the measurable sets in Pr, containing W and closed under
complementation and countable union, and µ : F → [0,1] is a probability measure, such that µ(W) = 1
and µ(
⋃
nVn) =
∑
nµ(Vn) for every countable sequence {Vn} of mutually disjoint measurable sets Vn ∈ F .
As usual, we define the conditional probability µ(U |V) = µ(U ∩V)/µ(V) when µ(V) > 0.
Let Prop be a set of atomic propositions. A probabilistic interpreted system over Prop is a tuple
I = (R,Pr1, . . . ,Prn,pi) such that R is a system, each Pri is a function mapping each point (r,m) of R
to a probability space Pri(r,m) in which the carrier is a subset of R×N, and pi : R×N→ P(Prop) is
an interpretation of some set Prop of atomic propositions. Intuitively, the probability space Pri(r,m)
captures the way that the agent i assigns probabilities at the point (r,m), and pi(r,m) is the set of atomic
propositions that are true at the point.
We will work with probabilistic interpreted systems derived from synchronous systems in which
agents have a common prior on the set of runs. To define these, we use the following notation. For a
system R, a set of runs S ⊆ R and a set of points U ⊆ R×N, define
S(U) = {r ∈ S | ∃m : (r,m) ∈ U}
to be the set of runs in S passing through some point in the set U. Conversely, for a set S of runs and a
set U of points, define
U(S) = {(r,m) ∈ U | r ∈ S}
to be the set of points in U that are on a run in S. Note that if there exists a constant k ∈ N such that
(r,m) ∈ U implies m = k, then the relation r↔ (r,k) defines a one-to-one correspondence between S(U)
and U(S). In synchronous systems, in which the sets Ki(r,m) satisfy this condition, this gives a way to
move between sets of points considered possible by an agent and corresponding sets of runs.
Suppose that R is a synchronous system, let Pr = (R,F ,µ) be a probability space on the system R,
and let pi be an interpretation on R. Intuitively, the probability space Pr represents a prior distribution
over the runs. We assume that for all points (r,m) ∈ R×N and agents i, we have that R(Ki(r,m)) ∈ F
is a measurable set and µ(R(Ki(r,m))) > 0. (This assumption can be understood as saying that, accord-
ing to the prior, each possible local state ri(m) of agent i at time m has non-zero probability of being
the local state of agent i at time m.) Under this condition, we define the probabilistic interpreted sys-
tem I(R,Pr,pi) = (R,Pr1, . . . ,Prn,pi) such that Pri associates with each point (r,m) the probability space
Pri(r,m) = (Ki(r,m),Fr,m,i,µr,m,i) defined by
Fr,m,i = {Ki(r,m)(S) | S ∈ F }
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and such that
µr,m,i(U) = µ(R(U) | R(Ki(r,m)) )
for allU ∈Fr,m,i. Intuitively, because the set of runsR(Ki(r,m)) is measurable, we can obtain a probability
space with carrier R(Ki(r,m)) by conditioning in Pr. Because of the synchrony assumption there is, for
each point (r,m), a one-to-one correspondence between points in Ki(r,m) and runs in R(Ki(r,m)). The
construction uses this correspondence to induce a probability space onKi(r,m) from the probability space
on R(Ki(r,m)). We remark that under the additional assumption of perfect recall, it is also possible to
understand each space Pri(r,m+ 1) as obtained by conditioning on the space Pri(r,m). See [17] for a
detailed explanation of this point.
2.2 Probabilistic Temporal Epistemic Logic
To specify properties of probabilistic interpreted systems, a variety of logics can be formulated, drawing
from the spectrum of temporal logics. Our main interest is in a reasoning about subjective probability
and time, so we first consider a natural way to combine existing temporal and probabilistic logics. For
purposes of comparison, it is also helpful to consider a rather richer monadic second order logic of
probability and time, that is closely related to a logic for which some decidability results are known.
We may combine temporal and probabilistic logics to define a logic CTL∗KP that extends the tem-
poral logic CTL∗ by adding operators for knowledge and probability. Its syntax is given by the grammar
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ∧φ | Aφ | Xφ | φUφ | Kiφ | f (P, . . . ,P) ./ c
P ::= Pri(φ) | Priori(φ)
where p ∈ Prop, c is a rational constant, ./ is a relation symbol in the set {≤,<,=,>,≥}, and f (x1, . . . , xk) is
multivariate polynomial in k variables x1, . . . xk with rational coefficients. Instances of P are called basic
probability expression. The instances generated from f (P, . . . ,P) are called probability expressions, and
are expressions of the form f (P1, . . . ,Pk), obtained by substituting a basic probability expression Pi for
each variable xi in f (x1, . . . , xk). For example,
4Pr1(p)5 ·Pr2(q)3 + 715Pr1(p)
is an instance of f (P, . . . ,P) obtained from f (x,y) = 4x5y3 + 715 x by substituting Pr1(p) for x and Pr2(q)
for y.
Intuitively, formula Kiφ expresses that agent i knows φ. The formula Aφ says that φ holds for all
possible system evolutions from the current situation. The formula Xφ expresses that φ holds at the
next moment of time. The formula φ1Uφ2 says that φ2 eventually holds, and φ1 holds until that time.
The expression Pri(φ) represents agent i’s current probability of φ, Priori(φ) represents agent i’s prior
probability of φ, i.e., the agent’s probability of φ at time 0. The formula f (P1, . . . ,Pk) ./ c expresses
that this polynomial combination of current and prior probabilities stands in the relation ./ to c. We use
standard abbreviations from temporal logic, in particular, we write Fφ for trueUφ.
A restricted fragment of the language that may be of interest is the branching time fragment in which
the temporal operators are restricted to those of the temporal logic CTL. That is, X and U are permitted
to occur only in combination with the operator A, in one of the forms AXφ, EXφ, Aφ1Uφ2, Eφ1Uφ2,
where we write Eφ as an abbreviation for ¬A¬φ. We call this fragment of the language CTLPK. The
motivation for considering this fragment is that the complexity of model checking is in polynomial time
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for the temporal logic CTL, whereas it is polynomial-space complete for the richer temporal logic CTL∗
[7]. The logic CTLPK is therefore, prima facie, a candidate for lower complexity once knowledge and
probability operators are added to the logic.
The semantics of the language CTL∗KP in a probabilistic interpreted system I =I(R,Pr,pi) is given
by interpreting formulas φ at points (r,m) of I, using a satisfaction relation I, (r,m) |= φ. The definition
is mutually recursive with a function [·]I,(r,m) that assigns a value [P]I,(r,m) to each probability expression
P at each point (r,m). This requires computing the measure of certain sets. For the moment, we assume
that all sets arising in the definition are measurable. We show later that this assumption holds in the cases
of interest in this paper.
We first interpret the probability expressions at points (r,m) of the system I, by
[Priφ]I,(r,m) = µr,m,i({(r′,m′) ∈ Ki(r,m) | I, (r′,m′) |= φ})
[Prioriφ]I,(r,m) = µr,0,i({(r′,0) ∈ Ki(r,0) | I, (r′,0) |= φ})
[ f (P1, . . . ,Pk)]I,(r,m) = f ([P1]I,(r,m), . . . , [Pk]I,(r,m))
The satisfaction relation is then defined recursively, as follows:
1. I, (r,m) |= p if p ∈ pi(r,m)
2. I, (r,m) |= ¬φ iff not I, (r,m) |= φ
3. I, (r,m) |= φ1∧φ2 iff I, (r,m) |= φ1 and I, (r,m) |= φ2
4. I, (r,m) |= Aφ if I, (r′,m) |= φ for all runs r′ with r′[0 . . .m] = r[0 . . .m],
5. I, (r,m) |= Xφ if I, (r,m+1) |= φ
6. I, (r,m) |= φ1Uφ2 holds if there exists k ≥ m such that I, (r,k) |= φ2, and I, (r, l) |= φ1 for all l with
m ≤ l < k.
7. I, (r,m) |= Kiφ if I, (r′,m′) |= φ for all (r′,m′) ∈ Ki(r,m).
8. I, (r,m) |= f (P1, ...,Pk) ./ c if [ f (P1, ...,Pk)]I,(r,m) ./ c.
2.3 Probabilistic Monadic Second Order Logic
Temporal modal logics refer to time in a somewhat implicit way. An alternative approach is to work
in a setting with more explicit references to time, by using variables denoting time points. Kamp’s
theorem [24] establishes an equivalence in the first order case, but by adding second order variables and
quantification, one can obtain richer logics, that frequently remain decidable in the monadic case. In this
section, we develop a logic in this style for time and subjective probability.
We define the logic WMLOKP as follows. We use two types of variables: time variables t and
set variables X. Time variables take values in N and set variables take finite subsets of N as values.
Probability terms P have the form Pr(φ) or the form Pri,t(φ) where i ∈ Agt is an agent, t is a time
variable, φ is a formula. Formulas φ are defined by the following grammar:
φ ::= p(t) | X(t) | t1 < t2 | f (P, . . . ,P) ./ c | ¬φ | φ∧φ |
Ki,t(φ) | ∀t(φ) | ∀X(φ)
where t, t1, t2 are time variables, p is an atomic proposition, X is a set variable, i is an agent, c ∈ Q is a
rational constant, f is a rational polynomial (see the discussion above for CTL∗KP), and ./ is a relation
symbol from the set {=,<,≤,>,≥}.
270 Undecidable Cases of Model Checking Probabilistic Temporal-Epistemic Logic
Intuitively, in this logic formulas are interpreted relative to a run. Instead of indexing by a single
moment of time, as in the logic above, we relativize the satisfaction relation to an assignment of values
to the temporal and set variables. Atomic formula p(t) says that proposition p holds at time t. Similarly,
a (finite) set X of times can be interpreted as a proposition, and we can understand X(t) as stating that the
value of t is in X. (We remark that there is a fundamental difference between the types of propositions
denoted by atomic propositions p and set variables X: whereas the atomic propositions may depend on
structural aspects of the run, such as the global state at time t, the set variables may refer only to the time.)
The atomic formula t1 < t2 has the obvious interpretation that time t1 is less than time t2. The constructs
∀t(φ) and ∀X(φ) correspond to universal quantification over times and finite sets of times respectively.
They say that φ holds on the current run for all values of the variable. (Taking finite sets amounts to the
weak interpretation of second order quantification. One could also consider a strong semantics allowing
infinite sets of times. We have opted here for the weak interpretation to more easily relate our results to
the existing literature.)
The probability term Pr(φ) refers to the probability of φ in the probability space on runs. The meaning
of probability term Pri,t(φ) is agent i’s probability at time t that the run satisfies φ. Similarly, Ki,tφ says
that agent i knows at time t that the run satisfies φ. Note that, whereas in CTL∗KP, the formula Kiφ
always expresses that agent i knows that φ holds at the “current time”, in WMLOKP, formulas such as
∃u(u < t∧Ki,t(p(u)))
talk about the agent’s knowledge, at some time t, about what was true at some earlier time u. A similar
point applies to probability expressions.
Accordingly, for the semantics of WMLOKP, we use a variant of interpreted systems in the form
I = (R,Pr,pi), where R is a system, i.e., a set of runs, and pi is an interpretation, as above, but where Pr =
(R,F ,µ) is a probability space with carrier equal to the set of runs R, rather than a mapping associating
a probability space over a set of points with each agent at each point.
When dealing with formulas with free time and set variables, we need the extra notion of an as-
signment for the time and set variables. This is a function τ such that for each free time variable t we
have τ(t) ∈ N, and for each free set variable X we have that τ(X) is a finite subset of N. Given such an
assignment, we give the semantics of probability terms and formulas by a mutual recursion. We give the
semantics of formulas φ by means of a relation I, τ,r |= φ defined as follows:
1. I, τ,r |= p(t) if p ∈ pi(r, τ(t)), when p is an atomic proposition,
2. I, τ,r |= X(t) iff τ(t) ∈ τ(X), if X is a set variable,
3. I, τ,r |= t1 < t2 iff τ(t1) < τ(t2),
4. I, τ,r |= ¬φ iff not I, τ,r |= φ,
5. I, τ,r |= φ1∧φ2 iff I, τ,r |= φ1 and I, τ,r |= φ2,
6. I, τ,r |= Ki,t(φ) if I, τ,r′ |= φ for all (r′,m′) ∈ Ki(r, τ(t)),
7. I, τ,r |= f (P1, ...,Pk) ./ c if [ f (P1, ...,Pk)]I,τ,r ./ c,
8. I, τ,r |= ∀t(φ) if I, τ[t 7→ n],r |= φ for all n ∈ N,
9. I, τ,r |= ∀X(φ) if I, τ[X 7→ U],r |= φ for all finite U ⊆ N.
In item (7), the definition is mutually recursive with the semantics of probability terms, which are inter-
preted as real numbers, relative to a temporal assignment. We define
[Pr(φ)]I,τ,r = µ({r′ ∈ R | I, τ,r′ |= φ})
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and
[Pri,t(φ)]I,τ,r =
µ({r′ ∈ R | (r, τ(t)) ∼i (r′, τ(t)), I, τ,r′ |= φ})
µ({r′ ∈ R | (r, τ(t)) ∼i (r′, τ(t))})
[ f (P1, . . . ,Pk)]I,τ,r = f ([P1]I,τ,r, . . . , [Pk]I,τ,r)
As above, we assume measurability of the sets required, and also that the agent probability expressions
do not involve a division by zero. We later justify that this holds in the particular setting of interest in
this paper.
A particular class of formulas of WMLOKP will be of interest below. Define a mixed-time polyno-
mial atomic probability formula to be a formula of the form1
∃t1 . . . tn( f (Pr(φ1), . . . ,Pr(φm)) = 0)
where f (x1, . . . , xm) is a rational polynomial and each φi is an atomic formula of the form p(t j) for
some proposition p and j ∈ {1 . . .n}. We motivate the usefulness of such temporal mixing of probability
expressions in Section 2.5.
The logic WMLOKP generalizes several logics from the literature. If we restrict the language by
excluding the probability comparison atoms f (P1, . . . ,Pk) ./ c and knowledge formulas Ki,t(φ), we have
the Weak Monadic Logic of Order, which is equivalent to WS1S [4]. We obtain the Probabilistic Monadic
Logic of Order considered in [3], which we denote here by PMLO, if we
• exclude the knowledge operators Ki,t,
• exclude agent’s probability terms Pri,t(φ), and
• limit the global probability comparisons to be of the form Pr(φ(t1, . . . , tk)) ./ c, containing just a
single probability term Pr(φ(t1, . . . , tk)), with the further constraint that the only free variables of φ
should be temporal variables t1, . . . tk.
In particular, second-order quantification into probability expressions, e.g., ∀X[Pr(X(t)) > c] is not per-
mitted in PMLO, but second order quantification that does not cross a probability operator, such as
Pr(∀X[X(t))]) > c, is allowed. We note that PMLO does allow first order quantifications into the scope
of probability, such as ∀t[Pr(p(t)) > c].
In the sequel, we refer to quantification into the scope of a knowledge formula or probability expres-
sion as quantifying-in.
2.4 Partially Observed Markov Chains
Although they provide a coherent semantic framework, probabilistic interpreted systems are infinite
structures, and therefore not suitable as input for a model checking algorithm. We therefore work with a
type of finite model called an interpreted partially observed discrete-time Markov chain, or PO-DTMC
for short. A finite PO-DTMC for n agents is a tuple M = (S ,PI,PT,O1, ...,On,pi), where S is a finite set of
states, PI : S → [0..1] is a function such that∑s∈S PI(s) = 1, component PT : S ×S → [0,1] is a function
such that
∑
s′∈S PT (s, s′) = 1 for all s ∈ S , and for each agent i ∈ Agt, we have a function Oi : S →O for
some set O. Finally, pi : S →P(Prop) is an interpretation of the atomic propositions Prop at the states.
Intuitively, PI(s) is the probability that an execution of the system starts at state s, and PT (s, t) is the
probability that the state of the system at the next moment of time will be t, given that it is currently s.
1The TARK 2015 pre-proceedings version of this paper incorrectly had a universal quantifier in this definition. The existen-
tial form is needed for the correctness of Theorem 11.
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The value Oi(s) is the observation that agent i makes when the system is in state s. (Below, in the context
of interpreted systems, we treat the set of states S as the states of the environment rather than as the set
of global states. Agents’ local states will be derived from the observations.)
Note that the first three components (S ,PI,PT ) of a PO-DTMC form a standard discrete-time Markov
chain. This gives rise to a probability space on runs in the usual way. A path in M is a finite or infinite
sequence ρ = s0s1 . . . such that PI(s0) , 0 and PT (sk, sk+1) > 0 for all k with 0 ≤ k < |ρ| − 1. We write
P∞(M) for the set of all infinite paths of M. Any finite path ρ = s0s1 . . . sm defines a set
P∞(M) ↑ ρ = {ω ∈ P∞(M) | ω[0 . . .m] = ρ} (2)
That is, P∞(M) ↑ ρ consists of all infinite paths which have ρ as a prefix.
We now define a probability space Pr(M) = (P∞(M),F ,µ) over the set P∞(M) of all infinite paths of
M. The σ-algebra F is defined to be the smallest σ-algebra over P∞(M) that contains as basic sets all
the sets P∞(M) ↑ ρ for ρ = s0s1 . . . sm a finite path of M. For these basic sets, the function µ is defined by
µ(P∞(M) ↑ ρ) = PI(s0) ·PT (s0, s1) · . . . ·PT (sm−1, sm) .
The fact that µ can be extended to a measure on F is a non-trivial result of Kolmogorov for more general
stochastic processes [25].
We may construct several different probabilistic interpreted systems from each PO-DTMC, depend-
ing on what agents remember of their observations. We consider two, one that assumes that agents have
perfect recall of all their observations, denoted spr, and the other, denoted clk, which assumes that
agents are aware of the current time and their current observation. Recall that runs in an interpreted
system map time to global states, consisting of a state of the environment and a local state for each agent.
We interpret the states of the PO-DTMC M as states of the environment. To obtain a run, we also need
to specify a local state for each agent at each moment of time. We use the the observations to construct
the local states.
In the case of the synchronous perfect recall semantics, given a path ρ ∈ P∞(M), we obtain a run ρspr
by defining the components at each time m as follows. The environment state at time m is ρspre (m)= ρ(m),
and the local state of agent i at time m is ρspri (m) = Oi(ρ(0)) . . .Oi(ρ(m)). Intuitively, this local state
assignment represents that the agent remembers all its past observations. We write Rspr(M) for the set
of runs of the form ρspr for ρ ∈ P∞(M). Note that this system is synchronous: if r = ρspr and r′ = ωspr
then for each agent i and time m ∈N, if ri(m) = r′i (m′), then Oi(ρ(0)) . . .Oi(ρ(m)) =Oi(ω(0)) . . .Oi(ω(m′)),
which implies m = m′.
For the clock semantics, we construct a run a ρclk in which again the environment state at time
m is ρclke (m) = ρ(m), and for agent i we define the local state at time m by ρ
clk(m) = (m,Oi(ρ(m)).
Intuitively, this says that the agent is aware of the clock value and its current observation. We write
Rclk(M) for the set of runs of the form ρclk for ρ ∈ P∞(M) an infinite path of M. This system is also
synchronous: if r = ρclk and r′ = ωclk then for each agent i and time m ∈ N, if ri(m) = r′i (m′), then
(m,Oi(ρ(m))) = (m′,Oi(ω(m′))), hence m = m′. In both cases of x ∈ {spr,clk}, if T is a subset of P∞(M),
we write T x for {ρx | ρ ∈ T }.
In both cases of x ∈ {spr,clk}, we have a one-to-one correspondence between the infinite paths
P∞(M) and the runs Rx(M). We therefore can induce probability spaces Prx(M) on Rx(M) from the
probability space Pr(M) on P∞(M). As described above, the probability space Prx(M) on runs moreover
induces a probability space Prxi (r,m) on the set of points considered possible by each agent i at each
point (r,m). The PO-DTMC M gives us an interpretation pi on its states, and we may derive from this
an interpretation pix on the points (r,m) of Rspr(M) and Rclk(M) by defining pix(r,m) = pi(re(m)). Using
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the general construction defined above, we then obtain the probabilistic interpreted systems Ix(M) =
I(Rx(M),Prx(M),pix) for x ∈ {spr,clk}.
It is necessary to establish the measurability of the sets corresponding to formulas for the semantic
definitions of the logics above to be complete. This is established in the following result.
Lemma 1 Let M be a finite PO-DTMC and x ∈ {spr,clk}. For every set S ⊆ R(M) of runs of M such
that the semantic definitions above of CTL∗KP and WMLOKP in Ix(M) refer to µ(S ), the set S is
measurable in Pr(M).
2.5 Discussion
We have defined our logics to be quite expressive in the type of atomic probability assertions we have
allowed, which involve polynomials of probability expressions. In WMLOKP, these expressions may
explicitly refer to different time points. Some existing logics of probability in the literature use a more
restricted expressiveness, e.g., [12] consider a logic that has only linear combinations of probability
expressions, and many logics [3, 33] allow only inequalities involving a single probability term. Here
give some motivation to show that the richness we have allowed is natural and useful for applications.
Polynomials: There are several motivations for allowing polynomial combinations of probability
expressions. One, as noted in [13], is that polynomials arise naturally from conditional probability. If we
would like to include linear combinations of conditional probability expressions in the language, we find
that this motivates a generalization to polynomial combinations of probability expressions. Consider the
formula Pr(φ1|ψ1)+Pr(φ2|ψ2) ≤ c. Expanding out the definition of conditional probability, we have
Pr(φ1∧ψ1)
Pr(ψ1)
+
Pr(φ2∧ψ2)
Pr(ψ2)
≤ c .
We see here that there is a risk of division by zero that needs to be managed in order for the semantics of
this formula to be fully defined. One way to do so is to multiply out the denominators, resulting in the
form
Pr(φ1∧ψ1) ·Pr(ψ2)+Pr(φ2∧ψ2) ·Pr(ψ1) ≤ c ·Pr(ψ1) ·Pr(ψ2)
which is meaningful in all cases. (Should this not have the desired semantics in case one of the Pr(ψi)
is zero, an additional formula can be added that handles this special case as desired.) However, although
we started with a linear probability expression, we now have multiplicative terms. This suggests that the
appropriate way to add the expressiveness of conditional probability to the language is to admit atomic
formulas that compare polynomial combinations of probability expressions.
More generally, although it is less of relevance for purposes of model checking, and more of use for
axiomatization of the logic, allowing polynomials also naturally enables familiar reasoning patterns to
be captured inside the logic. In particular, validities such as Pr(φ1∨φ2) = Pr(φ1)+Pr(φ2) when φ1 and
φ2 are mutually exclusive and Pr(φ1 ∧φ2) = Pr(φ1) ·Pr(φ2) when φ1 and φ2 are independent show that
both addition and multiplication of probability terms arises naturally.
Mixed-time: A second way in which our logics are rich is in allowing probability atoms that refer to
different moments of time. In CTL∗KP this already the case because combinations such as PriorA(φ) =
PrA(φ) are allowed, which refer to both the current time and to time 0. The logic WMLOKP takes such
temporal mixing further by allowing reference to time points explicitly named using time variables.
Such temporal mixing is natural, since there are potential applications that require this expressive-
ness. For example, in computer security, one often wants to say that the adversary A does not learn
anything about a secret from watching an exchange between two parties. However, it is often the case
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that the adversary knows some prior distribution over the secrets. (For example, the secret may be a
password, and choice of passwords by users are very non-uniform, with some passwords like ‘123456’
having a very high probability.) This means that the simple assertion that the adversary does not know
the secret, or that the adversary has a uniform distribution over the secret, does not capture the appropri-
ate notion of security. Instead, as recognised already by Shannon in his work on secrecy [34], we need
to assert that the adversary’s distribution over the secret has not changed as a result of its observations.
This requires talking about the adversary’s probability at two time points. For example, [20] capture an
anonymity property by means of formulas using terms PriorA(φ) = PrA(φ).
Mixed-time polynomials: Additionally, the logic of probability applied to formulas referring to dif-
ferent times leads naturally to polynomial combinations of probability terms, each referring to a different
moment of time. For example, although PMLO allows only formulas of the form Pr(φ(t1, . . . , tn)) ./ c,
where the ti are time variables, the decision algorithm of [3] uses the fact that, when t1 < t2 < . . . < tn, the
formula φ(t1, . . . , tn) is equivalent to a formula of the form φ1(t1)∧φ2(t2− t1)∧ . . .φn(tn− tn−1)∧φn+1(tn),
where the φi(t) are independent past-time formulas for i = 1 . . .n and φn+1(t) is a future time formula.
(This statement is closely related to Kamp’s theorem [24].) This enables Pr(φ(t1, . . . , tn)) to be expressed
as a sum of products of terms of the form Pr(φi(u)) where φi(u) has just a single free time variable u.
Thus, although mixed-time probability formulas are not directly expressible in the logic of [3], specific
ones are implicitly expressible, and the extension is a mild one. It is worth remarking, however, that
the coefficients of the polynomial expansion of Pr(φ(t1, . . . , tn)) are all positive, so we do not quite have
arbitrary polynomials here. We return to this point below.
3 Relating the logics
The logic WMLOKP is very expressive, so it is not surprising that it can capture all of CTL∗KP. The
following result makes this precise.
For the results below, it is convenient to add to the system a special agent ⊥ that is blind, and an agent
> that has complete information about the state. In the context of PO-DTMC’s these agents are obtained
by taking the observation functions to satisfy O⊥(s) = O⊥(t) and O>(s) = s for all states s, t. We write φ
for K⊥,tφ where t is any time variable. This gives a universal modality: φ says that φ holds on all runs.
We write [t 7→ n] for the temporal assignment defined only on temporal variable t, and mapping this to n.
Proposition 2 Let M be a PO-DTMC with agent > and let x ∈ {spr,clk}. For every formula φ of
CTL∗KP, there exists a formula φ∗(t) ofWMLOKPwith t the only free variable, such thatIx(M), (r,n) |=
φ iff Ix(M), [t 7→ n],r |= φ∗(t) for all runs r.
Proof: The translation is defined by the following recursion:
p∗(t) = p(t)
(¬φ)∗(t) = ¬φ∗(t)
(φ1∧φ2)∗(t) = φ∗1(t)∧φ∗2(t)
(Xφ)∗(t) = ∃u(u = t+1∧φ∗(u))
(Kiφ)∗(t) = Ki,t(φ∗(t)),
(φ1Uφ2)∗(t) = ∃u ≥ t(φ∗2(u)∧∀v(t ≤ v < u⇒ φ∗1(v)))
(Pri(φ))∗(t) = Pri,t(φ∗(t))
(Priori(φ))∗(t) = Pri,0(φ∗(0))
( f (P1, . . . ,Pk) ./ c)∗(t) = f (P∗1(t), . . . ,P
∗
k(t)) ./ c
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Note that u = v is definable as ¬(u < v∨ v < u), that u = t+ 1 is definable as u > t∧∀v > t (u ≤ v), and
that u = 0 is definable as ¬∃t(u = t+1). We can use (Aφ)∗(t) = K>,t(φ∗(t)) to translate Aφ in the perfect
recall case. In case of the clock semantics, this translation loses the information about the initial state,
which is required for correctness of the translation of Priori(φ). In this case, we introduce, without loss
of generality, new propositions ps for each state s, such that ps ∈ pie(t) iff s = t, and take
(Aφ)∗(t) =
∧
s∈S
(ps(0)⇒ K>,t(ps(0)⇒ φ∗(t))) .

With respect to the specific systems we derive from PO-DTMC’s with respect to the clock and perfect
recall semantics, we are able to make some further statements that simplify the logic WMLOKP by
eliminating some of the operators. These results are useful for the undecidability results that follow.
For the following results, we note that, without loss of generality, we may assume that a finite PO-
DTMC comes equipped with atomic propositions that encode the observations made by the agents.
Specifically, when agent i has possible observations Oi(S ) = {oi,1, . . . ,oi,ki}, we assume that there are
atomic propositions obsi, j for i ∈ Agt and j = 1 . . .ki such that for all states s, we have obsi, j ∈ pi(s) iff
Oi(s) = oi, j. Thus, obsi, j(t) holds in a run just when agent i makes observation oi, j at time t.
Proposition 3 With respect to Iclk(M) for a finite PO-DTMC M, the operators Ki,t and Pri,t can be
eliminated using the universal operator  and polynomial comparisons of universal probability terms
Pr(ψ), respectively. For simple probability formulas Pri,t(φ) ./ c, only linear probability comparisons
are required.
Proof: The formula ∧
j=i...ki
(obsi, j(t)⇒ (obsi, j(t)⇒ φ)
is easily seen to be equivalent to Ki,t(φ) in Iclk(M). Similarly, Pri,t(φ) ./ c can be expressed as∧
j=i...ki
(obsi, j(t)⇒ Pr(obsi, j(t)∧φ) ./ c ·Pr(obsi, j(t))) .
A similar transformation applies for more general agent probability comparisons, but we note that linear
comparisons may transform to polynomial comparisons: similarly to the discussion of conditional prob-
ability in Section 2.5. 
Proposition 4 With respect to Ispr(M) for a finite PO-DTMC M, the probability formulas Pri,t(φ) ./ c
can be reduced to linear comparisons using only terms Pr(ψ), provided second-order quantifying-in is
permitted. Knowledge terms Ki,t can be reduced to the universal modality , provided second-order
quantifying-in is permitted for this modality.
Proof: Define κi(X1, . . . ,Xki , t) to be the formula
∀t′ ≤ t(
∧
j=1...ki
Xi(t′)⇔ obsi, j(t′))
Intuitively, this says that, up to time t, the second order variables X1, . . . ,Xk encode the pattern of occur-
rence of observations of agent i up to time t. The formula
∀X1, . . .Xki(κi(X1, . . . ,Xki , t)⇒ (κi(X1, . . . ,Xki , t)⇒ φ)
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is easily seen to be equivalent to Ki,t(φ) in Iclk(M). Similarly, Pri,t(φ) ./ c can be expressed as
∀X1, . . .Xki( κi(X1, . . . ,Xki , t)⇒
Pr(κi(X1, . . . ,Xki , t)∧φ) ./ c ·Pr(κi(X1, . . . ,Xki , t))) .

One might wonder whether the knowledge operators can be eliminated entirely using probability,
treating Kiφ as Pri(φ) = 1. This is indeed the case for formulas φ in CTLPK. The essential reason is that
because formulas of CTLPK depend at a point (r,m) only on the run prefix r[0 . . .m], so the possibility
that ¬φ holds on a non-empty set of measure zero does not occur.
Proposition 5 For all CTLPK formulas φ and PO-DTMC’s M and x ∈ {clk,spr} we have Ix(M) |=
Kiφ⇔ Pri(φ) = 1.
However, this is not the case for formulas Kiφ where φ is an LTL formula. Consider the following
Markov Chain. Here we have, at the initial state s, that ¬Ki(F¬q), because the agent considers it possible
s t
p
1-p
1
q ¬q
that always q (this holds for all choices of observation functions). However, we have Pri(F¬q) = 1,
since the only run where ¬q does not eventually hold is the run that always remains at s. This run has
probability zero.
4 Undecidability Results
We can now state the main results of the paper concerning the problem of model checking formulas of
(fragments of) the logics CTL∗KP and WMLOKP in a PO-DTMC M, with respect to an epistemic
semantics x ∈ {spr,clk}. Using the results of Section 3, we also obtain conclusions about extensions of
PMLO that do not refer to agent probability and knowledge.
For a formula φ of CTL∗KP, we write M |=x φ, if Ix(M), (r,0) |= φ for all runs r ∈ Rx(M). In the
case of WMLOKP, we consider sentences, i.e., formulas without free variables, and write M |=x φ, if
Ix(M), τ,r |= φ for all runs r ∈ Rx(M) and the empty assignment τ. The model checking problem is to
determine, given a PO-DTMC M, a formula φ, and semantics x ∈ {clk,spr}, whether M |=x φ.
4.1 Background
For comparison with results below, it is worth stating a result from [3] concerning decidability of the
fragment PMLO of WMLOKP that omits knowledge operators Ki,t and agent probability terms Pri,t(φ),
restricts probability comparisons to the form Pr(φ) ./ c, and prohibits second order quantification to cross
into probability terms. Since the structure of agent’s local states is irrelevant in this case, we write simply
I(M) for the probabilistic interpreted system corresponding to a PO-DTMC M. To state the result, we
define the parameterized variant of a formula φ of PMLO to be the formula φx1,...,xk , in which each
subformula of the form Pr(ψ) ./ c is replaced by a formula Pr(ψ) ./ xi, with xi a fresh variable. We call
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the resulting formulas the parameterized formulas of PMLO. For some α ∈ Qk, we can then recover the
original formula φ as the instance φα obtained from the parameterized variant φx1,...,xk of φ by substituting
αi for xi for each i = 1 . . .k.
Theorem 6 ([3]) For each parameterized sentence φx1,...,xk of PMLO, one can compute for all  > 0 a
representation of a set Hφ ⊂ Rk of measure at most , such that the problem of determining if I(M) |= φα
is decidable for α ∈ Q \Hφ.
Intuitively, the complement of Hφ contains the points that are bounded away from limit points of the
Markov chain, and comparisons can be decided using convergence properties.
The reason for excluding the set Hφ is that the limit point cases seem to require a resolution of
problems related to the Skolem problem concerning zeros of linear recurrences [35]. A sequence of real
numbers {un} is called a linear recurrence sequence (LRS) of order k if there exist a1, . . .ak with ak , 0
such that for all m ≥ 1,
uk+m = a1uk+m−1 +a2uk+m−2 + · · ·+akum .
We consider the following decision problems associated with a LRS {un}.
1. Skolem problem. Does there exist n such that un = 0?
2. Positivity problem. Is it the case that for all n, un ≥ 0?
3. Ultimate positivity problem. Does a positive integer N exist such that for all n ≥ N, un ≥ 0?
We will deal with sequences with rational entries. By clearing denominators the rational version of the
above problems can be shown to be polynomially equivalent to similar problems stated using sequences
with integer entries. There has been a significant amount of work on these problems [11], but they have
stood unresolved since the 1930’s. To date, only low order versions of these problems have been shown
to be decidable [16, 31, 37].
The above problems have an equivalent matrix formulation. A proof of the following can be found
in [16].
Lemma 7 For a sequence u0,u1, . . . , the following are equivalent.
1. {un} is a rational LRS.
2. For n ≥ 1, un = (An)1k for a square matrix A with rational entries.
3. For n ≥ 1, un = vTAnw where A is a square matrix, and v and w are vectors with entries from {0,1}.
In the usual formulation of the Skolem, positivity and ultimate positivity problems, the associated matri-
ces A may contain negative numbers, and numbers not in [0,1], so are not stochastic matrices. However,
[1] show that these problems can be reduced to a decision problem stated with respect to stochastic
matrices:
Lemma 8 Given an integer k× k matrix A, one can compute a k′ × k′ stochastic matrix B, a length k′
stochastic vector v, a length k′ vector w = (0, . . . ,0,1) and a constant c such that (An)1,k = 0 ((An)1,k > 0)
iff vTBnw = c (respectively, vTBnw > c).
As noted in [1], it follows that the logic PMLO is able to express the Skolem and positivity problems,
using model checking questions of the form
M |= ∃t(Pr(p(t)) = c)
and
M |= ∃t(Pr(p(t)) > c)
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for c a nonzero constant and M a DTMC. (The ultimate positivity problem can also be expressed.) It is
worth noting that in the special case of the constant c = 0, these model checking questions are decidable,
as shown in [3]. (Essentially, in this case the problems reduce to graph reachability problems, and the
specific probabilities in M are irrelevant.) The transformation from arbitrary matrices A to stochastic
matrices B in Lemma 8 requires that the constant 0 of the Skolem problem be replaced by a non-zero
constant c.
The above model checking problems of the quantified logic PMLO can be seen to be already ex-
pressible in the propositional logic CTL∗KP, as the problems
M′ |=clk AF(pri(p) = c)
M′ |=clk AF(pri(p) > c)
M′ |=clk AFAG(pri(p) > c)
where we obtain the PO-DTMC M′ from the DTMC M by defining Oi(s) = ⊥ for all states s. That is,
agent i is blind, so considers all states reachable at time n to be possible at time n. (We remark that this
implies that all the operators A can be exchanged with E without change of meaning of the formulas.)
It follows, that with respect to clock semantics, a resolution of the decidability of model checking even
these simple formulas of CTL∗KP for all c ∈ [0,1] would imply a resolution of the Skolem problem. In
view of the effort already invested in the Skolem problem, this is likely to be highly nontrivial.
4.2 Perfect Recall Semantics
Model checking with respect to the perfect recall semantics is undecidable, even with respect to a very
simple fixed formula of the logic CTL∗KP, as shown by the following result.
Theorem 9 The problem of determining, given a PO-DTMC M, if M |=spr EF(Pri(p) > c), for p an
atomic proposition, is undecidable.
Proof: (Sketch) By reduction from the emptiness problem for probabilistic finite automata [32]. In-
tuitively, the proof sets up an association between words in the matrix semigroup and sequences of
observations of the agent.
A probabilistic finite automaton is a tupleA= (Q,Σ,v0,A,F,λ), where Q is a finite set of states, Σ is a
finite alphabet, v0 :Q→ [0,1] is a probability distribution over states, representing the initial distribution,
A : Σ→ (Q×Q→ [0,1]) associates a transition probability matrix A(a) with each letter a ∈ Σ, component
F ⊆Q is a set of final states, and λ ∈ (0,1) is a rational number. Each matrix A(a) satisfies∑t∈S A(a)(s, t)=
1 for all s ∈ Q. Let vF be the column vector indexed by Q with vF(s) = 0 if s < F and vF(s) = 1 if s ∈ F.
Treating v0 as a row vector, for each word w = a1 . . .an ∈ Σ+, define f (w) = v0A(a1) . . .A(an)vF . The
language accepted by the automaton is defined to beL(A) = {w ∈ Σ+ | f (w) > λ}. The emptiness problem
for probabilistic finite automata is then, given a probabilistic finite automaton A, to determine if the
language L(A) is empty. This problem is known to be undecidable [32, 8].
Given a probabilistic finite automatonA, we construct an interpreted finite PO-DTCM MA for a sin-
gle agent (called i rather than 1 to avoid confusion with other numbers) such that MA |=spr EF(Pri(p)>λ)
iffA is nonempty. This system is defined as follows. We let N = |Σ|,
1. S = Q×Σ,
2. PI(q,a) = µ0(q)/N,
3. PT ((q,a), (q′,b)) = A(b)(q,q′)/N
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4. Oi((q,a)) = a
5. p ∈ pi((q,a)) iff q ∈ F.
Note that
∑
(q,a)∈S PI((q,a)) =
∑
a∈Σ
∑
q∈Qµ0(q)/N =
∑
a∈Σ 1/N = 1, so PI is in fact a distribution. Simi-
larly, for each (q,a) ∈ S , we have ∑(q′,b)∈S PT ((q,a), (q′,b)) =∑b∈Σ∑q′∈QA(b)(q,q′)/N =∑b∈Σ 1/N = 1,
so PT is in fact a stochastic matrix.
Note that for each w = a1 . . .an ∈ Σ∗ and a ∈ Σ, we get a row vector µaw = µ0A(a1) . . .A(an) with∑
q∈Qµaw(q) = 1, which can be understood as a distribution on Q. For each run r ∈ Rspr(MA) and m ≥ 0,
we have that that agent i’s local state ri[0 . . .m] at (r,m) is a word in Σ+. Let B(q,m) be the set of runs
r ∈ Rspr(MA) in which re(m) = (q,a) for some a ∈ Σ. We claim the following about the probability
measures µr,m,i in the probabilistic interpreted system Ispr(MA), for each point (r,m) and q ∈ Q:
µr,m,i(Ki(r,m)(B(q,m))) = (v0A(ri(1)) . . .A(ri(m)))(q) .
It is immediate from this that Ispr(MA), (r,m) |= Pri(p) = c where c = f (r[1 . . .m]), and the desired result
follows. 
We remark that this result stands in contrast to the situation for model checking the logic of knowl-
edge and time. Write CLTL∗K for the logic obtained from CTL∗KP by omitting the probability com-
parison atoms f (P1, . . . ,Pk) ./ c. Model checking the logic CLTL∗K with respect to perfect recall, i.e.,
deciding M |=spr φ for M a PO-DTMC and φ a formula is decidable [29]. (Here, for the semantic struc-
tures M, it suffices to replace the initial distribution PI in M by the set I = {s ∈ S | PI(s) > 0}, and replace
the transition distribution function PT in M by the relation R of possibility of transitions between states
defined by sRt if PT (s, t)> 0. The results in [29] use linear time temporal logic as a basis, but, as noted in
[30], the modality A of the branching time logicCTL∗ can be understood as a special case of a knowledge
modality: see Proposition 2.)
For probabilistic automata the minimum size of the state space giving undecidability directly stated in
the literature appears to be 25 [19]. We remark that the proof of Theorem 9 can also be done by reduction
of the following matrix semigroup problem: given a finite set of matrices of order n, generating a matrix
semigroup S , determine whether there is M ∈ S such that (M)1n = 0 [15]. The case of k generators of size
n×n can be reduced to probabilistic automata with 2kn+1 states. Recent results on the matrix semigroup
problem are given in [5].
Huang et al [22] have previously used a reduction from probabilistic automata to show undecidability
of an probabilistic epistemic logic with respect to perfect recall. Compared to our simple CTL temporal
operators, their logic uses more expressive setting of alternating temporal logic operators.
4.3 Clock Semantics
The undecidability of the perfect recall semantics for such simple formulas suggests that we weaken the
epistemic semantics to the clock case. The combination of the translation from CTL∗KP to WMLOKP
(Proposition 2) and Theorem 6 then enables some cases of CTL∗KP to be decided. We do not obtain
a full decidability result, however, since we face the problem that, with respect to the clock semantics,
the formula AF(Pri(p) = c) can express the Skolem problem, so resolving its decidability is a very
difficult problem. Rather than attempt to resolve this question, we consider here just how much extra
expressiveness is required over the logic of Theorem 6 for us to obtain a definitive undecidability result,
instead of a decidability result with some excluded and unresolved cases.
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Note that one of the restrictions on PMLO used in Theorem 6 is that second order quantification
should not cross into probability terms. It turns out that this restriction is essential, as shown by the
following result.
Theorem 10 It is is undecidable, given a PO-DTMC M and a formula φ of WMLOKP with linear
combinations of probability terms Pr(φ) and quantifying-in of second-order quantifiers, whether M |= φ.
Proof: This follows from the fact that, using second order quantifying-in, we can express perfect recall
(Proposition 4), and the undecidability of model checking perfect recall (Theorem 9). 
Note that the result refers to |= rather than |=clk, since epistemic operators are not required. This
is really a result about a generalization of PMLO. One of the other restrictions in Theorem 6 is that
only simple probability comparisons of the form Pr(φ) ./ c are permitted. More general comparisons of
probability terms are needed in applications (see discussion in Section 2.5), so it is of interest to study
their impact on decidability. Unfortunately, it turns out to be quite negative. Even the simple case of
mixed time polynomial atomic probability formulas is enough for undecidability.
Theorem 11 There exists a fixed PO-DTMC M with 4 states such that it is undecidable, given a mixed-
time polynomial atomic probability formula ψ, whether M |= ψ.
Proof: By reduction from Hilbert’s tenth problem, i.e., the problem of determining whether a polyno-
mial with integer coefficients has solutions in the natural numbers. This was shown to be undecidable by
Matiyasevich [28].
We show that we can find a stochastic matrix M and a stochastic vector f such that for each func-
tion f (t) = t · λt and f (t) = λt with λ = 1/2, there is a rational vector g such that f (t) = fTMtg. Given
a polynomial p(n1, . . . ,nk), we can construct a variant polynomial q′ over a larger set of variables, such
that an appropriate substitution of such functions ti · λti and λti , for the ni and the additional variables
yields an expression λd1t1+...+dktk · p(t1, . . . , tk), where the di are constants. This has a zero in the t1 . . . tn iff
p(x1, . . . , xn) has a zero. It follows that mixed-time polynomial atomic probability formulas can express
Hilbert’s tenth problem. 
We remark that the possibility of encoding Hilbert’s tenth problem is not immediate from the fact
that we are dealing with polynomials, since our polynomials are over rational values generated in a
very specific way from Markov chains, rather than arbitrary integers. Indeed, there are decidable logics
containing polynomials, such as the theory of real closed fields [36].
As noted in Section 2.5, formulas (allowed by Theorem 6) of the form Pr(φ(t1, . . . , tn)) ./ c can be
written as a polynomial of probability expressions, so it is natural to ask whether such formulas also
suffice to make the logic undecidable. This does not seem to be the case: the polynomials involved have
only positive coefficients. Since Hilbert’s tenth problem is trivially decidable for polynomials with only
positive coefficients, our proof does not apply to this case.
5 Conclusion
Our results have by no means resolved Skolem’s problem, which remains an apparent barrier to resolving
the gap between the decidability results of [3] and the undecidability results of the present paper.
However, in work to be presented elsewhere, we show that the results of [3] can be extended both by
reducing the set Hφ of cases that needs to be excluded to obtain decidability, as well as enhancing the
R. van der Meyden & M. K. Patra 281
expressiveness to cover epistemic probabilistic terms of the form Pri(φ), interpreted with respect to the
clock semantics.
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